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Payment-in-kind bonds (PIKs) make interest payments in the form of an 
issue of additional bonds rather than cash.  This research provides a rationale for 
the recent PIK issuance by firms with low credit ratings.  PIKs offer a financially 
constrained firm in need of restructuring both an immediate automatic stay and a 
prepackaged bankruptcy procedure,  features  that  make  PIKs better than 
alternative debt instruments.  In many instances PIKs are structured to facilitate a 
contingent transfer of control to PIK holders, and provide an avenue of obtaining 
equity in the firm whether the firm value is high or low in the future.  The barbell 
strategy of acquisition that involves a deal with the equity holders (if the firm 
prospects improve), and a deal with the debt holders (if the firm defaults) 
dominates the cost of acquisition before the firm defaults, or after the firm goes 
bankrupt.    
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1.  Introduction 
A payment-in-kind bond (PIK) is a debt contract wherein interest is paid in 
the form of additional bonds, rather than cash.  Table I summarizes data on PIK 
issues for the five year period 2003-07.  PIKs have seen increased issuance in the 
recent past, with some issuance after the financial crisis of 2007.  The data reveals 
that more than half of the issuing firms were corporations with non-investment 
grade ratings,  that were financially constrained at the time of issue.  Also, the 
stated purpose of the PIK issue is a restructuring of the firm operations, in more 
than half of these cases.  A few issues are associated with Leveraged Buyouts 
(LBOs) wherein PIKs alleviate the interest charge during a period of restructuring, 
when there is no room for further debt service.  In the case of PIKs associated with 
LBOs, PIKs can again be likened to companies with financial constraints that need 
restructuring.   
At first glance, a PIK is not very different from a zero coupon bond.  Both 
securities make a single bullet payment at maturity, but beyond this, PIKs and 
Zeros differ significantly.  Zeros are issued by firms with a good credit rating, and 
are purchased by insurance companies, pension funds, and passive and dispersed 
investors.  PIKs, as seen in Table I, are issued by firms with financial constraints 
and firms in need of restructuring, and are held by active investors, such as private 
equity funds and hedge funds.2
                                                            
2 A review of prior year issues and articles in the press (e.g., Financial Times article “Payment in 
kind giving risky financing a new look”, May 25, 2006) reveals that these securities have high 
coupon rates with equity warrants attached to the bonds, and these bonds are held by hedge funds 
and active investors.  Warren Buffet was amongst the active investors for some of these securities. 
 The characteristics of firms that issue PIKs are   3 
crucial in understanding the role of PIKs and its contract design.  This paper offers 
an analysis of the  stated  rationale for PIK financing.  We ask  -  under what 
conditions does PIK financing make economic sense for a firm that wants to 
restructure?  How do the features of a PIK contract facilitate a transfer of control of 
the firm to PIK holders, as is often the case?   
PIK financing creates substantial value for existing claimholders over and 
above the amount raised (existing equity and debt prices would appreciate).  
Therefore, unlike standard debt offerings, PIK financing typically requires 
negotiations between the firm’s existing claimholders and the new PIK investors 
on the terms of the deal.   PIKs allow the firm to postpone coupon payments at a 
time of financial fragility when funds are needed to implement a restructuring 
plan.  The automatic stay on coupons implicit in the contract provides a chance for 
firm prospects to  improve.  This automatic stay benefits both current equity 
holders and existing bond holders.  Equity holder claims are akin to an out-of-the-
money call option that gains from the PIK cash infusion, when otherwise they 
would be worth little.  Similarly, the firm can continue to service its existing debt, 
and existing bond holders avoid a costly bankruptcy for the foreseeable future.  
PIK investors understand that a surplus (value) is created by PIK financing and, 
therefore, bargain for a portion of the benefits generated because of this financing.  
While negotiations provide a mechanism to split the surplus between the various 
parties, in order to be feasible PIKs must ensure that at least one party is better off 
while the others are not worse off.   
The differences in interests and the stakes involved make the various parties 
agree upon the division of the surplus at the time of the PIK financing, thus 
avoiding a potentially costly conflict later (see Bulow and Shoven, 1978).  Because 
equity holders garner the upside potential in firm value, they agree that, if the firm 
is solvent at the maturity of the PIK debt, they will pay PIK holders the principal   4 
amount plus any accumulated coupons.  These payments may include a debt-for-
equity swap  or equity warrants if the firm is solvent at maturity of the PIK 
contract.  In many instances, the payout gives PIK holders substantial warrants that 
provide an avenue to become a significant shareholder in the firm.   
However, given the financial constraints of the firm, the risk that the firm 
will not be solvent at the maturity of the PIK bonds is high.  In the event of 
insolvency equity holders receive nothing, and PIK holders and the existing bond 
holders become joint claimants to the residual assets.  The partitioning of the assets 
of the bankrupt firm is the outcome of a bargaining process between senior bond 
holders and PIK holders that also occurs when PIKs are issued.  In this negotiation, 
PIK holders attempt to claim a significant fraction of the assets of the firm in case 
the firm does not survive, and some even bargain for control.  We show that the 
bargaining between PIK holders and the existing firm’s bond holders affects and is 
affected by the bargaining between PIK holders and the firm’s equity holders.   
One advantage of PIK contracts over alternative debt contracts is that PIKs 
offer a financially constrained firm in need of restructuring both an immediate 
automatic stay and a prepackaged bankruptcy procedure.  These features of PIK 
contracts reduce the deadweight costs of bankruptcy both potential costs to the 
claimants of a constrained firm.  3
Besides the valuation implications, the size of the payments under PIK 
financing and the potential for equity swaps makes a change in control likely, and 
consequently PIKs are structured to facilitate this outcome.  We show that PIKs are 
a more effective mechanism to take control of the firm than the alternative of an 
outright acquisition of the equity of the firm by the same investors.  If PIK holders 
were instead to buy out the equity of the firm right away, they would still have to 
        
                                                            
3 See Tashidian, Lease and McConnell (1996) for an empirical study of prepackaged bankruptcies.  
Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez (1996) find that prepackaged bankruptcies are used by firms that 
are economically viable but face severe liquidity constraints.     5 
provide funds for restructuring as well as for interim coupon flows on outstanding 
debt.  In return, they would reap only the upside potential of the firm’s value.  
They would get no payout were the firm to go bankrupt.   
Similarly, PIK investors could choose not to provide financing, but let the 
firm go bankrupt and then purchase its assets.  If restructuring costs are the same 
in either case, PIK financing compared to the purchase of the assets of the bankrupt 
firm changes a sure cost of acquisition into an expected cost of buying out current 
debt holders plus interim coupon funding.  For reasonable parameter values, PIK 
financing is preferable.   
What makes PIKs interesting is that they provide PIK investors with a way 
of obtaining equity at both high  and low firm values.  The barbell strategy 
involving a deal with the equity holders (if the firm improves) and a deal with the 
debt holders (if the firm defaults) dominates an acquisition from the equity holders 
before the firm defaults, and an acquisition from the bond holders after the firm 
goes bankrupt.    
It is the design of a PIK contract which makes it attractive compared to other 
debt contracts.  The drawback of regular debt financing is that it requires the firm 
to pay coupons at a time of low earnings (liquidity shortage).  As a result, more 
cash is needed to pay the coupons (relative to PIK financing), and the firm is more 
likely to go bankrupt before the maturity of the debt.  Therefore, the ex-ante firm 
value is higher with PIKs than if straight coupon debt is issued.  Furthermore, PIK 
financing also mitigates the transfer of benefits of additional financing to the firm’s 
other claimholders, thus resolving the debt overhang problem.  The reason is that 
PIK coupons added to the face value of the debt make the claims of PIK holders 
grow at a faster rate than the claims of current debt holders.     6 
Convertible bonds are not optimal either because they are bets on the upside 
potential of a firm and require coupon payments, even though these are lower than 
the coupons of regular debt.   
Interestingly, the role of PIK financing is similar in many respects to that of 
preferred stock in later stage investments by venture capital funds.  Venture capital 
firms provide financing in the form of preferred stock with no definite maturity 
that allows investors to make intermediate payments but can roll over coupons 
after consultation with debt holders.  The roll over feature reduces the cash 
burning rate of the firm and the likelihood of forced stoppage.  In general, the 
interest rates on these loans are low and these early stage firms have little or no 
regular debt on their books, as opposed to a setting with existing debt considered 
in this paper.  Also, preferred stock holders can convert their loans into regular 
equity at a later date if the firm goes public or is bought out.  At the same time, 
preferred securities have priority over regular equity were the firm to go bankrupt 
(see Sahlman (1990), Bascha and Walz (2001)).   
Our model uses a continuous time approach  that allows us to nest the 
results in a broad literature on structural models of capital structure and credit risk 
that have used this approach in the past.  This also permits us to make the 
computations and numerical results comparable to the extant literature.  We wish 
to provide a practical answer on a security design that is welfare improving 
relative to more standard financial contracts, and thus offer an explanation as to 
why some financial contracts exist in particular settings.  Agency costs are implicit 
in this set up in that equity holders, who control the assets, maximize the value of 
the equity, and they are the ones that decide whether to declare bankruptcy or not.   
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model of a firm 
with PIKs.  Section 3 discusses why PIKs are an efficient contract for restructuring 
a financially distressed firm compared to regular debt, convertible bonds or equity.     7 
Section 4 discusses PIKs as a mechanism for controlling the firm.    Section 5 
characterizes the bargaining game between the stakeholders that sets the terms of a 
PIK contract, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
  
      2.   A model with equity, debt and PIKs  
We outline a model of a firm that needs funds for restructuring.  Consider a 
firm with productive assets that generate operating cash flows or earnings before 
interest and taxes of  ) (t δ .  The earnings follow a continuous time process with 
constant proportional volatility under the risk neutral measure: 
         ( )






+ =                              (1) 
where  µ   is the total expected rate of increase of  ) (t δ ,  σ   is the instantaneous 
volatility of the earnings, and dz is the increment of a standard Brownian motion.  
If the firm were financed entirely with equity, equity holders would receive after 
tax a flow of  ) ( ) 1 ( t δ τ −  at all times.  The unlevered value of the firm is equal to the 
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We assume that the firm is partly financed with debt, and that the debt is a 
consol bond with coupon flow CH per period, where C is the coupon rate and H is 
the face value of bonds sold originally.  The cash flow requirements for coupon 
payments are normally met through internal cash flow generation( ) CH t > ) ( δ .  If 
the cash flows generated by the firm  ) (t δ   cannot cover coupon payments 
( ) CH t < ) ( δ , the firm faces financial constraints.  In a full information setting, debt   8 
financing is motivated by tax savings (equal to τ CH each period), but can drive the 
firm into costly bankruptcy when the equity holders are no longer willing to fund 
these coupon payments.  Let  α  equal the fraction of the asset value that current 
debt holders receive in the event that the firm goes bankrupt, leaving equity 
holders with nothing, where  1 0 < <α .   
Assume that the firm needs additional funds to pay for restructuring costs 
and to keep servicing the coupon payments on outstanding bonds.  This is the 
starting point in our analysis.  At this time firm value equals  L V .  This value is 
higher than the endogenous liquidation barrier,  B V ,4  at which the  equity value 
would be driven to zero if there were no restructuring costs.  Equity holders are 
unwilling to provide new funds for restructuring because the cash infusion results 
in a transfer of wealth to the debt holders.5
) 1 ( α −
  The restructuring costs can be seen as a 
one-time investment made at time 0 to realign the business, without which the firm 
will need to suspend operations and declare bankruptcy.  These costs are distinct 
from the bankruptcy costs  that are borne by debt holders were the firm to 
default.   
Suppose that when firm value equals  L V  the financially constrained firm 
issues a new class of claims: payment–in-kind debt (PIK).6
                                                            
4 The endogenous bankruptcy barrier in the absence of restructuring costs is the point at which 
equity holders are no longer willing to fund losses in the firm. 
5 This is the underinvestment effect first analyzed by Myers (1977). 
6 A financially distressed firm with cash flow problems would issue additional debt because upon 
returning to profitability, and if the restructuring plan succeeds, the tax shields are valuable.     
 A PIK is a debt contract 
wherein interest is paid in the form of additional bonds, rather than cash.  In the 
next section we show why the financially distressed firm resorts to PIKs to solve its 
funding needs.  Our objective is to clarify that PIKs are particularly useful contracts 
when the firm is unable to pay restructuring costs while simultaneously servicing 
debt obligations.     9 
The amount raised from the sale of PIKs is denoted  Z , and the maturity of 
the PIKs is set at the expected period necessary to reorganize the firm, denoted T.  
Since the cash raised from selling PIKs is used to service the existing debt and to 
restructure the firm, both existing debt holders and equity holders benefit from the 
refinancing with PIKs.  Therefore, PIKs necessarily involve negotiations between 
the firm’s existing claimholders and PIK investors (discussed in Section 5).  This 
explains why PIKs are concentrated in the hands of  active investors, normally 
hedge funds.      
The feature that PIKs do not require intermediate interest payments and are 
used to pay coupon on existing debt provides the debtor with an automatic stay 
and avoidance of bankruptcy.  This is equivalent to giving the firm liquidity when 
liquidity is most valuable.  The payment received by a PIK holder at maturity is 
equal to the initial amount lent to the firm plus accrued coupons.  If the firm is 
solvent at T, PIK holders receive:   




T PK                      (2) 
where  ) (T PK  is the total payout at maturity to PIK holders, and the coupon rate on 
PIK debt is denoted  PIK C .   
If the firm does not restructure immediately, it would need to file for 
bankruptcy.  If the firm raises cash, the business would continue and improve, 
once the restructuring is completed at time T.  To incorporate the effects of the 
restructuring, we assume that in  T  periods the value of the firms’  assets (or 
earnings) will increase by a factor of  1 ≥ λ  if the firm is solvent.  Any operating 
cash flows generated by the firm during the restructuring period are also directed 
toward restructuring costs, and equity holders do not receive any intermediate 
dividends.     10 
Since PIKs in general have a shorter maturity than the current debt, PIKs 
could effectively obtain a senior priority.  We assume, however, that current bonds 
are protected and that PIKs have equal priority with current debt holders.7
1 0 ≤ ≤ p
  We 
assume that, upon the issuance of PIKs, both existing debt and PIKs are repaid at T, 
and after this date the firm reverts to an all equity firm.  This assumption is not 
critical to the analysis but helps disentangle the role of PIKs from the choice of the 
terminal capital structure and priority considerations. 
If the firm were to go bankrupt at time T, the possible bankruptcy payouts 
are split: a proportion p ( ) is received by current debt holders and (1-p) is 
paid to PIK holders.  In this section, we consider  PIK C  and p as given parameters.  
Later, we relax this assumption in a model of bargaining among  PIK holders, 
equity holders and original bond holders.   
Given that the firm receives an inflow of cash (Z) from the sale of PIKs, we 
want to analyze its impact on the value of the various claims.  Suppose  BT V  is the 
value of firm assets at the maturity (T ) of the PIK contract below which the equity 
holders are unwilling to pay back PIK holders and declare bankruptcy.  Evidently 
BT V  is equal to the face value of existing debt (H) plus the terminal value of PIKs 
( ) (T PK ).  Then, using the earnings value process in equation (1) and risk-neutral 
valuation, and given  that  ( ) ( ) T T N
V
T V
Ln σ σ µ , 5 . 0 ~
) 0 (






, the price of the 
outstanding debt at time 0 is the value of two components – the interim coupons 
and the payment at time T:   
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7 The analysis with subordinated PIK debt is more complicated and does not add relevant insights 
to the more important issues  of PIKs’ role and design.      11 
where  ( )
T




σ µ λ ) 5 . 0 ( /
2 − −
= ,  ( ) d N   is the cumulative normal density 
function and corresponds to the probability that  ( ) BT V T V ≤ λ ,  ) 0 ( D  is the value of 
existing debt at time 0,   BT V  is the bankruptcy level at the maturity of the PIK 
contract, and H is the face value of debt repaid.  The first term on the right hand 
side in equation (3) is the value of the intermediate coupon payments to existing 
debt holders, made possible by the sale of PIK debt.  The second term has two 
terms in the brackets: the first is the value of existing debt if the firm becomes 
solvent and PIK debt is repaid (if  ( ) BT V T V > λ ), and the last term is the bankruptcy 
payout if the firm is not solvent at maturity of the PIK contract (if  ( ) BT V T V ≤ λ ).     
The payout to PIK holders equals the sum of the payout if the firm is solvent 
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The overall firm value accrues to the three claimants: original bond holders, equity 
holders and PIK holders.  The firm value after the issuance of PIKs is given by:  
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Where  ) 0 ( F  is the firm value at time 0.  The first line of the right hand side of 
equation (5) is the value of the firm if the firm is restructured and solvent at T, 
( ( ) BT V T V > λ ), and the bankruptcy payout if the firm is not solvent at the maturity 
of the PIK contract ( ( ) BT V T V ≤ λ ).  The second line is the tax benefit of debt that can   12 
be availed if the firm were to become solvent.8 ) (t S  Equity holders, denoted by , are 
the residual claimants:  
    ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( PK D F t S − − = =                             (6) 
In summary, the firm needs a cash infusion for restructuring when its value 
reaches  L V .  The firm raises an amount Z via an issuance of PIK debt with maturity 
T  and  a payment-in-kind coupon rate  PIK C ,  which in turn give the promised 
payment to PIK holders  ) (T PK  if the firm survives at T.   Given the amount raised 
via the PIK sale and the coupons on existing debt (C), we can compute the value of 
the remaining claims –  existing debt, equity and the firm value (equations (3) 
through (6)).   
 
3.  The efficiency of PIKs   
   In this section we show that PIKs are Pareto improving debt contracts for 
three reasons.  First, PIKs offer a temporary workout that allows the firm to avoid 
the immediate costs of bankruptcy.  Second, PIKs exchange zero debt payments 
when firm earnings are low for repayment when the firm’s earnings (and value) 
are  high.  This  makes  the firm’s capital structure approach the optimal capital 
structure: when the firm has low earnings it reduces interest payments, and when 
the firm has high earnings, the PIK debt  is repaid.  Third, PIKs solve the 
underinvestment problem that would pertain if the firm were to finance its needs 
with additional equity or the issuance of other forms of debt, such as straight 
coupon debt or convertible bonds.   
                                                            
8 We assume that PIK coupons enjoy tax benefits.  Bali (2005) provides an overview of the legal 
issues relating to deductibility of PIK coupon payments.  Consistent with our formulation, the 
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 removed any tax timing incentives for the issuance of PIKs.     13 
Let us first characterize the magnitude of the total gain in firm value as a 
result of the PIK financing, and assess the gains that accrue to debt holders, equity 
holders and PIK holders.   
 
Proposition 1:   
(a) The surplus created by the introduction of a PIK contract ( ) T p CPIK , , is equal to the 
firm value after PIK funding minus the firm value in the absence of any funding, and is 
given by:  
                    
( ) [ ]
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(b) The distribution of the total surplus Π amongst current debt holders, equity holders 
and PIK holders from the introduction of a PIK contract is equal to: 
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Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
Feasibility of the PIK contract requires that equations (7) to (10) are 
individually and simultaneously positive.  In equation (7), the first term in brackets 
in the first line is the expected value of the firm after completing the restructuring 
and if the firm is solvent by the time the PIKs mature.  The second term in brackets 
in the first line is the expected value of the firm at the maturity of the PIK contract 
if the firm is not solvent when the PIKs mature.  The first term on the second line is 
the gain from the interim tax deductibility of revenues, that applies because the 
company continues in business but that would be lost if the firm were to declare   14 
bankruptcy right away.  The last two terms are the outside options of the various 
claimholders.  These terms capture the payoffs to claim holders that are deducted 
from the overall gain to give the net gain from the PIK deal.   
Note that the payment profile of  the  PIK  contract  is deferred and state 
contingent.  At the outset, when the firm value is low, PIKs provide a cash infusion 
Z and require no coupon payments.  The cash injected via the PIK sale results in 
enhanced earnings once the restructuring is complete (increase in firm value by a 
factorλ ), and a part of the cash is set aside to pay coupons to the current debt 
holders.  Equity holders repay the PIK coupon and principal at maturity only if the 
firm value recovers to a level  BT V .  Thus, initially the leverage ratio -measured by 
the market value of the outstanding debt relative to firm value- is approximately 1, 
because the firm is likely to file for bankruptcy.  As we show later, financing with 
PIKs results in a surplus to all claim holders, and the claim of equity holders is 
positive.  Hence, the ratio of the market value of current debt plus PIKs relative to 
the value of the firm is less than 1.  The firm value refinanced with PIKs is then 
closer to the optimal leverage than it was before the PIK issue.   
The net surplus that accrues to debt holders (equation (8)) is composed of 
the same components as in equation (3): the interim coupon payments, the value of 
debt if the firm survives, and the share of payouts in bankruptcy at T (the latter 
being a prepackaged bankruptcy agreement that depends on the bargaining power 
of the parties at the time of the PIK financing).  The last term is the payoff received 
were the firm to go bankrupt right away.   
Similarly, equation (9) gives the surplus that accrues to equity holders.  This 
is obtained by giving equity holders a second chance, from the PIK automatic 
workout.   The terms in equation (10) represent the payments to PIK holders net of 
their cash injection, Z.     15 
PIK holders receive compensation if the firm is either solvent or bankrupt at 
T.   PIK C  determines the upside compensation and defines the barrier below which 
the firm defaults at the maturity of the PIK contract.  If the firm is not solvent, PIK 
holders get (1-p) of the bankrupt firm assets.  Alternatively, the PIK contract can 
include  upside compensation in the form of cashless warrants, which would 
transfer wealth from equity holders to PIK holders. 
From the expression for Π, the appropriateness of PIK financing depends 
on: (1) the type of the firm, namely on the deadweight costs of bankruptcy (1-α ), the 
expected rate of earnings increase that captures in part the economic health of the 
firm  (µ ), and the volatility of earnings (σ ), and (2) the  requirements and risks 
imposed by the restructuring, which directly determine the terms of the contract: the 
amount raised via the PIK sale (Z), the PIK coupon rate ( PIK C ) and the maturity (T).   
 
Remark 1:  The sensitivity of the overall surplus Π in Proposition 1 to the type of firm and 
the contract type is given by (using proposition 1):  
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where  n(d)  and  N(d)  denote the standard normal density function and the 
cumulative normal density function, respectively.   
From equation (11), firms with a higher residual value after bankruptcy 
have a lower surplus from PIK financing,  primarily because such firms have a 
more valuable outside option for current debt holders.  Thus firms with assets that 
can be easily sold and with lower bankruptcy costs find PIKs a less viable avenue 
of financing.  Equation (12) shows that PIK financing benefits firms whose gains 
from restructuring (λ  plus tax deferral), net of the recovery amount were the firm 
to go bankrupt right away, are high.  Equation (13) shows that an expected higher 
growth in earnings, µ , increases the surplus.  That is, an economically sound firm 
has higher chances of survival from the restructuring effort that PIKs afford.   
With respect to the contract features, equation (14) shows that the greater 
the amount Z needed for restructuring and for servicing existing debt, the lower 
the surplus.  This is evidently so because the higher is the amount borrowed, the 
higher is the repayment threshold,  BT V , and consequently the higher must be the 
earnings of the firm at the point at which equity holders are willing to repay PIKs.  
Equation (14) shows that this higher barrier reduces the option value of the firm by 













.  Thus, the firm value and tax benefits decrease when the 
amount of PIK refinancing, Z, increases.  Therefore, there is a level of restructuring 
costs above which PIKs are a less interesting form of financing.  The PIK coupon 
rate impacts the surplus in much the same way as Z.     17 
 
3.1  Regular bonds versus PIKs 
Other  securities  can also provide  financially constrained firm additional 
funds  for restructuring.  PIKs, however, allow for financing when the issue  of 
additional regular debt, convertible debt or an immediate equity infusion is not 
viable.  PIKs add value by reducing the probability of financial distress and by 
solving  the underinvestment problem created by a debt overhang  when other 
securities are not able to do so.   
Suppose that a firm instead finances its needs with the sale of additional 
regular debt with maturity T and face value Z and of equal priority with existing 
debt.  The primary difference in the interim cash flows between PIKs and regular 
debt is that when new regular debt is sold, the firm has to pay coupons denoted 
reg C to the new debt holders throughout the restructuring period.  In contrast, PIKs 
require payments when the restructuring is complete and the firm has an enhanced 
level of earnings.  In the case of new regular debt issuance, the new debt holders 
would share the bankruptcy payoffs with the former debt holders in proportion to 
the face values of debt.   
In this setting with regular debt there is a possibility that the firm may go 
bankrupt before the restructuring is complete if the firm is not able to service the 
newly issued debt.   Suppose  } { T I < τ  is the indicator function whose value equals 1 if 
the firm goes bankrupt (at time τ ) and  ) ( } { T I E < τ is the associated probability of 
bankruptcy before time T.  Now the value of the newly issued regular debt can be 
written as:   18 
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                           (16) 
where the bankruptcy barrier  Z H reg VBT + = ) (  and E is the expectation operator.  
The tradeoff between financing with regular debt relative to PIKs is that even 
though regular debt has a positive probability of bankruptcy before time T, the 
bankruptcy barrier at maturity of the regular debt contract,  Z H reg VBT + = ) ( , is 





Z H PIK V .   However, 
regular debt holders do not have the attendant clauses to ensure the upside and 
downside payoffs that accrue to PIK holders because of sharing in bankruptcy or 
via warrants.   Thus, regular debt changes the chance of financial distress and may 
not be viable if most of the gains to the additional financing accrue to the existing 
claimants.   
 
Remark 2: a) The firm has a lower chance of survival with regular debt financing relative 
to PIKs when: 
             ( ) ( ) ( ) )) ( ( ) ( ( 1 } { PIK V d N reg V d N I E BT BT T < − < τ                                 
  where  N  is the cumulative normal density function and 
( )
T




σ µ λ ) 5 . 0 ( /
2 − −
= . 
   
b)  Regular debt financing does not address the underinvestment problem 
and is not feasible when  ( 0, ) reg reg Dt C Z = < . 
    
 Proof: Follows directly from the preceding discussion. 
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Remark 2 provides a simple tradeoff facing the stakeholders of a firm - when 
L V  is low the probability of running out of cash to pay regular debt holders is high 
and regular debt financing is not feasible because } { T I < τ  is high, but PIK financing is 
a possibility so long as the restructured firm will generate enough cash flows so 
that PIK holders do not face an immediate loss.   
 
3.2  Convertible bonds versus PIKs  
PIKs provide an equity stake in the company whether the restructuring goes 
well and the firm recovers or whether the firm does poorly and loses its residual 
assets to debt holders.  Convertible bonds also provide equity in these states.  Why 
then shouldn’t such a firm use convertible debt to finance its restructuring costs? 
Alternatively, how are PIKs justified, given the possibility of convertible debt?  
To answer this question, suppose the cash for restructuring Z is raised by 
attaching an option to a regular bond that allows the bond holders to convert the 
bond into a certain number of shares.  That is, the convertible bond holders receive 
a coupon payment  conv C unless the newly issued bonds are converted to equity by 
time T.  These new bonds can be converted into equity if the value of assets reaches 
or exceeds  U V , a value that is higher than the current value of the firm’s assets and 
the bankruptcy boundary.  For simplicity, suppose the conversion is possible at 
maturity of the bonds only.  On conversion, suppose that the additional payout 
over and above the face value of debt is equivalent to γ  times the value of the firm 
assets  U V .  If, on the other hand there is not enough cash to pay the bond holders at 
a time before T, the firm files for bankruptcy and convertible bond holders split the 
assets with existing bond  holders  under equal priority.  Then, the value of a 
convertible bond is simply the value of a regular bond plus the upside equity 
option:   20 
  ( ) {} ( 0, ) ( 0, )
rT
conv conv reg conv U T D tC D tC E e V I τ γ
−
> = = = +                                         (17) 
When the value of the firm assets is high relative to the interim bankruptcy barrier, 
the value of coupon flows to a convertible bond is lower than flows to a regular 
fixed coupon bond.   Convertible bond holders trade off the reduced coupon flows 
with the potential payments on conversion.  Typically convertible bonds are such 
bets on the upside (see Hoffmeister (1977)), but do not contain special clauses for 
downside payments.  When firm value is very low, the conversion option has little 
value, and the coupon rate rises.  The payment of intermediate coupons increases 
the likelihood of bankruptcy before the restructuring is complete.  As shown before 
in the case of regular coupon bonds, the coupon may be too high to be feasible 
when the firm has low earnings.  The following remark summarizes this result: 
 
Remark 3:  Convertible debt  reduces the chance of survival and does not address the 
underinvestment problem when: 
( ) ( ) ( ) {} 1 (( ) (( ) ) T BT BT E I N d V conv N d V PIK τ< −<  and  ( 0, ) conv conv Dt C Z = <  
  where  () BT V conv H Z = +  
 
Proof:   This follows directly from the preceding discussion. 
 
One way to reduce the coupon on newly issued debt is to ask the current 
claimholders of the firm to share with the new debtors the outcome of the 
restructuring, whether the outcome is positive or negative.  This is precisely what 
PIK financing achieves.  If the firm goes bankrupt, PIK holders negotiate to receive 
a proportion  ( ) p − 1 α  of the residual value of the firm that is higher than the ratio 
received by convertible or regular debt holders.  Thus, the sensitivity of the value 
of PIKs to sharing one dollar in the downside is, in general, much smaller than the 
sensitivity of the value of the convertible security in this scenario.  On the other 
hand, if the firm recovers, PIKs receive a larger share than convertibles and regular   21 
bonds.  Therefore, the payment PIKs receive in the extremes is higher than the 
payments received by convertibles – i.e., the butterfly payoff in the case of PIKs is 
higher than that for convertibles.  For current bondholders to continue to be paid 
with the funds raised from PIKs, they must give up a sizeable portion of their 
claim in the event that the firm does not recover from the restructuring effort.  This 
is  precisely  why PIKs always involve a negotiation between PIK holders and 
current bondholders, something that does not occur when convertible bonds are 
issued.  Convertibles are held  mostly by widely  dispersed investors,  while 
holdings of PIKs are highly concentrated.  Furthermore, convertible bond holders 
do not have expertise in managing the assets of a firm as PIK holders do.  These 
salient features characterize the difference between PIKs and convertibles, even 
when both securities have equity payments on the upside as well on the 
downside.  9
Next we show that PIKs solve the underinvestment problem created by the 
refusal of equity holders to provide additional funds at time 0, although equity 
holders are willing to retire PIKs at T.  Equity financing is not incentive compatible 
at time 0 because all the gains accrue to existing bond holders while equity holders 
bear an immediate cost.  But why would equity holders be willing to refinance the 
PIK debt at maturity T, using equity, when they would not finance the firm at time 
0?  Because the repayment of PIK debt by equity holders occurs only if the firm’s 
   
 
3.3  Equity versus PIKs 
                                                            
9  The type of coupon-  floating or fixed-  is not central to this argument.  Because floating rate 
convertibles require coupon payments, they would generally be subject to the same limitations as 
regular convertibles as long as the floating rate is tied to some interest rate index that is 
independent of the firm behavior.   
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asset value has recovered to some level higher than what it was at the outset, and 
the firm does not need to incur any additional restructuring costs beyond that date.   
For a contract to be feasible, PIK holders must account for the ex-post behavior 
of equity holders, and that behavior should be consistent with ex-ante expectations.  
A PIK contract requires the PIK holders to impose the condition that equity holders 
do not face a loss when they inject cash.  If the amount of equity infusion required 
at the maturity of the PIK contract is more than the value of the equity in the firm 
after this infusion, equity holders would allow the firm to go bankrupt.  Thus, the 
level of assets  below which equity holders will be unwilling to pay back PIK 
holders,  BT V ,  must  imply that equity holders do not bear an immediate loss.  
Therefore, the contingent financing (payment only if the firm value is above  BT V ) 
does not penalize equity holders with an immediate loss.   
 
Remark 4:  Cash infusion by equity holders to retire PIK debt at maturity does not result 
in a transfer of wealth to senior bond holders, and a corresponding loss to equity 
holders. 
 
Proof:  See appendix 
 
The features of the PIK contract play an important role in mitigating wealth 
transfers from PIK holders to the other claim holders, especially when existing 
bond holders continue to be serviced with the money raised from selling PIKs.   
PIK financing avoids a wealth transfer to equity and debt holders because PIK 
coupons are cumulated on the face value of the bond- the claim of PIK holders 
grows at a faster rate than the claims of current debt holders or equity holders.  The 
higher PIK coupon requires more of a cash infusion from equity holders later if the 
firm is solvent, and also a higher level of sharing if the firm goes bankrupt.  Thus, 
PIKs address underinvestment by mitigating wealth transfers amongst claimants,   23 
and at the same time increase firm value and, consequently, the  firm’s  debt 
capacity. 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) explain how the issuance of bank debt in the 
presence of outstanding public debt can affect incentives to invest in a financially 
constrained firm.  The possibility of running into problems in the future and the 
need to renegotiate makes concentrated bank debt more easy to roll over if it is 
needed.  Bank debt plays a similar role for Gertner and Scharfstein to the role of 
PIKs herein, which alleviate the debt overhang problem and foster additional 
investment.  The simplicity of rolling over bank debt is in a way equivalent to the 
automatic delay of the payment of coupons in PIK debt.  While in Gertner and 
Scharfstein concentrated bank debt solves the underinvestment problem associated 
with debt overhang by institutional design and ex-post renegotiation, PIKs solve 
the problem by contract design and ex-ante bargaining.       
 
4.  Controlling a financially distressed firm with PIKs 
 
Next we show that PIKs provide an effective avenue for controlling the firm.   
In a particularly interesting case, New Look (an apparel company) structured a 
cash infusion that was financed by the management via a PIK offering instead of a 
management buyout.  A PIK contract achieved that more inexpensively than other 
more obvious alternatives.  Consider two obvious ways that investors may try to 
gain control of a distressed firm in need of restructuring: (1) by purchasing the 
outstanding equity, or (2) by purchasing the assets of the firm after the firm has 
gone bankrupt.10
                                                            
10 We do not consider an exchange offer to replace existing debt, since an exchange offer requires 
buying all the debt of the firm, as well as funding all the restructuring costs.  It is cheaper to buy the 
assets of the bankrupt firm.   
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The first alternative, an outright purchase of the equity of the firm, requires 
investors to fund restructuring costs as well as interim coupon flows.  For the same 
time horizon (T), control via the acquisition of equity requires the same amounts of 
funds as PIK financing, but offers control only if the firm is solvent.  PIK financing, 
on the other hand, offers the possibility of controlling the firm both on the upside 
(in case of a swap of the final payout on PIKs for equity and any warrants), and on 
the downside if the firm goes bankrupt (when 1-p is negotiated to be higher than 
0.5).  Thus, for the same investment, there is a higher probability of gaining control 
of the firm through PIKs even though the probability of survival may increase with 
equity financing. 
Allowing the firm to go bankrupt and purchasing firm assets immediately 
after that, will incur costs of  L V α , but save the interim coupons  ( )
rT e
r
CH − − 1  to the 
current  bond  holders.  If restructuring costs are the same in either case, PIK 
financing relative to the purchase of the assets of the bankrupt firm changes a sure 
cost of  L V α - ( )
rT e
r
CH − − 1  for an expected cost of  ( ) ) (d N e V p
T r
L
− µ α , for purchase of 
the residual assets of the bankrupt firm.   For reasonable parameter values  ) , ( p α , 
PIK financing is preferred.  These results are summarized in the following 
proposition:   
 
Proposition 2: PIK financing is a more efficient way to gain control of the distressed firm 
than:  
(a) An outright purchase of the firm’s equity.   
(b) The  purchase of the assets of the firm after it goes bankrupt when   
L V α - ( )
rT e
r





Proof:  See Appendix 
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The primary advantage of a PIK contract, from the perspective of PIK 
investors is that PIKs get a fraction of the firm both on the upside and on the 
downside.  This barbell strategy allows PIK holders to get a portion of the surplus 
on both sides of the return spectrum, and that proves to be better than other ways 
of getting control, which controls the firm only on one side – equity on the upside, 
and straight debt on the downside.  The likelihood of obtaining control with PIK 
debt depends on the features of the contract, ( PIK C ,p,T), which depend on the 
bargaining power of the PIK investors compared  to the firm’s current claim 
holders.   
 
Remark 5: PIK financing results in PIK holders gaining control from a barbell like payoff 
to the PIK holders –  
(a) On the upside, if the firm does well, PIK holders can swap their terminal 
payoff for equity  or obtain warrants.  The probability of control 
conditional on solvency is defined as:  
( ) { } BT T V V T PK T S > < +
+ | ) ( 2 Prob .   
(b) On the downside they gain control via the sharing of bankruptcy payoffs 
when (1-p) > 0.5. 
Proof: See Appendix   
Figure 1 graphs the probability of control for different coupon rates and 
different maturities of PIKs conditional on firm solvency.   By control we mean that 
PIK holders are allowed to swap their debt repayment for an equivalent number of 
shares.  An increase in the coupon rate increases the face value of the PIK bond and 
the number of outstanding shares that are transferred to PIK holders.  Note, 
however, that an increase in the coupon rate increases the payment to PIK holders 
while at the same time it reduces the chance that the equity value will exceed the 
payment to PIK holders by enough for equity holders to retain control.   
 
5.  Surplus sharing with bargaining    26 
 
     An important aspect of any refinancing is its implication for the distribution 
of the overall gain among the parties.  The extent of the surplus (value creation 
beyond the amount infused) depends on the terms of the PIK contract,( ) p CPIK, , for 
a given contract maturity T, which is set by the estimated interval needed to 
restructure the firm.  The very different interests and the need to avoid potential 
conflicts motivate the parties to agree on the partition of future profits at the 
moment of the PIK refinancing.  We assume that the outcomes involving the PIK 
refinancing are contractible at time 0.   
Here, we first consider the sharing of the gains when there is a single take-it or 
leave-it offer.   Next, we consider a more detailed setting, where the PIK holders 
negotiate with the debt holders and the equity holders separately to set the sharing 
and the terms of the PIK contract.   
 
5.1  Distribution of gains with a take it or leave it offer   
  Suppose that the various claimholders have one opportunity to say yes or no 
to the proposed refinancing of the firm with PIK debt, with given terms.  Each of 
the players has a veto in that any player can negate any proposed agreement by 
refusing to agree.  In the case of disagreement, the PIK refinancing deal collapses, 
and equity holders receive 0, the firm defaults and current debt holders receive 
L V α .  Then, PIK holders keep their cash (Z) that would otherwise be injected into 
the firm.   If a deal is approved, the surplus Π characterized in equation (7) is 
created.  One strategy for player i where   ( ) PIK E D i , , ∈  is to ask for a share  i a  of 
the surplus, net of the outside options:  
Π = − + − + ) ( ) ( Z a V a a PIK L D E α                                   (18)   27 
Given that the total of the asked surplus from the claimants is equal to the total 
surplus, no money is left on the table.  If a player asks for more than the total 
surplus Π, it would imply a negative payoff to at least one other player.  The Nash 
bargaining solution is the outcome that maximizes the product of the utilities of the 
various players (assuming risk neutrality): 
Z V a a a t s
Z a a V a Max
L PIK E D
PIK E D





) ( ) (
                       (19) 
Appendix C shows that the solution to this maximization problem is 
* * *
E PIK L D a Z a V a = − = −α .  This solution is efficient and invariant to the 
disagreement point.  It shows that the total surplus is split among the three claim 
holders, taking into account their different outside options, such that equations (8) 
to (10) are all equal, 
* * *
PIK E D Π = Π = Π .  Claim holders with the better outside 
options come out of the bargaining game in a better position.  Equity holders will 
get less, followed by PIK holders (because in general L V Z α < ) and debt holders will 
receive the biggest share of all.   
 
5.2  Separate bargaining with claimholders 
The Nash equilibrium solution in the previous section assumes that  the 
various claim holders will get together to decide on the split of the surplus when 
they have equal bargaining power.  It is more realistic to think that PIK holders 
conduct separate discussions with equity holders and with debt holders, and the 
outcome of these negotiations set an optimal pair  ) , (
* * p CPIK for a given T.     
Consider first how  PIK C  is linked to the surplus obtained by equity holders.  
Equity holders earn a surplus only if the firm recovers and is solvent at time T.  
PIK C  determines the bankruptcy barrier at time T, since coupons are paid in kind 
and accrue to the face value of PIK debt.  Equity holders are willing to pay back   28 




T PK  at the maturity of the PIK debt 
contract only if the residual value of the equity, after this payment, is higher 
than H T PK + ) (   
If the firm value is below  BT V , equity holders refuse to pay PIK holders and 
the firm is declared bankrupt.  Therefore, the outcome of the bargaining game 
between equity holders and PIK holders has a decisive impact on the likelihood of 
bankruptcy when PIKs mature.   PIK C  determines not only the split of the surplus 
between equity holders and PIK holders, but also the expected deadweight losses 
from bankruptcy.   
The fraction p determines the sharing of payouts at T if the firm is bankrupt.  
Note that the partitioning of assets involves PIK holders and current debt holders 
only.    Even if equity holders do not garner any part of the residual assets, 
however, changes in p are reflected in changes in  PIK C , and vice-versa.  Therefore, 
PIK C  and p affect one another.  PIKs, besides providing an immediate automatic 
stay in exchange for a higher payoff afterward, are structured as a prepackaged 
bankruptcy procedure.  The terms of the automatic stay and the prepackaged 
bankruptcy involve all the claimholders because of their interdependence.  These 
features of PIKs – automatic stay and prepackaged bankruptcy- can reduce the 
deadweight costs of bankruptcy, which are significant for the types of firms we are 
discussing. 
The lower bound on the extent of sharing of bankruptcy payouts by the 
current debt holders in bankruptcy is given by setting the value of debt in equation 
(3) equal to  L V α .  This is the amount that current debt holders receive if the firm 
defaults right away.  A  solution to this equation provides the minimum p that 
current debt holders are willing to accept.     29 
 
Remark 6:  The minimum proportion of payoffs in bankruptcy that current debt holders are 
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Proof:  Set the value of debt in equation (3) equal to  L V α  and solve for p.   
 
Comparative statics allow us to analyze how this minimum level of payout 
to debt holders in bankruptcy depends on α  and on  PIK C  (see results in Appendix 
C).  A higher α  increases the minimum level of payouts acceptable to debt holders 
in direct proportion to  L V .  This occurs because current debt holders are trading off 
bankruptcy right now versus accepting a PIK financing and sharing the proceeds 
with PIK holders if later the firm goes bankrupt.  With a higher α ,  a  higher 
amount is received by debt holders if the firm goes bankrupt right away, thus 
min
debt p  
increases.  Also, a higher α  increases the present value of the debt, conditional on 
firm solvency at maturity, and therefore reduces 
min
debt p , although the magnitude is 
smaller than the first term.  Overall, an increase in α  increases 
min
debt p .   Similarly, an 
increase in   PIK C  reduces  
min
debt p  because a decrease in the probability that the firm 
will survive and receive the face value of debt decreases 
min
debt p  . 
There is also a minimum level of bankruptcy payouts that must be made to 
PIK holders for them to accept the deal.  Recall that the amount contributed by 
PIKs depends on the amount of cash flows, Z, needed to finance the operations of 
the firm for a given period.  PIK holders receive an amount  ) (T PK  at maturity.  
Then, for PIK financing to be feasible, an appropriate payout is needed if the firm 
were to go bankrupt.  Using equation (4) and solving for p we get:     30 
 
Remark 7:  The maximum proportion of payoffs 
max
debt p  in bankruptcy that PIK holders are 
willing to pay debt holders is given by: 
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Proof:  Set the value of PIK in equation (4) equal to Z and solve for p. 
 
Again, we analyze how this maximum level of sharing depends on the 
residual proportion of assets that debt holders receive in bankruptcy, α , and the 
coupon rate on the PIK debt  PIK C .   As  α  increases, 
max
debt p  increases because it 
increases the assets left in bankruptcy.  Similarly, an increase in  PIK C  decreases 
max
debt p , because of an increase in the chance of bankruptcy, but on the other hand it 
increases 
max
debt p , because the value of PIK debt ( solv T PK ) ( ) increases.    
The outcome of the bargaining game between PIK holders and equity holders, 
on the one hand, and between PIK holders and debt holders, on the other hand, is 
characterized by the domain Ω for parameter pairs ( ) p CPIK, , and a given T,  that 











,   s.  t.  { } 0 , ≥ Π Π + Π D E PIK .                (22) 
Figure 2 graphs the feasible pair ( ) p CPIK,  for a PIK contract of maturity T, 
given other parameters that determine the value of the levered firm and the losses 
in case of bankruptcy.  The upper boundary of this domain corresponds to the 
payout restrictions for debt holders set in equation (20).    The lower boundary 
corresponds to the payout restriction set in equation (21).  The domain clearly 
shows that the coupon rate  PIK C  restricts the choices for the bankruptcy payout p 
and vice versa.  For example, the horizontal line in Figure 2  depicts that the   31 
maximum feasible values of the fraction of the asset values in bankruptcy, p, that 
current debt holders receive 0.22 when the PIK coupon rate is 14%.  In the example, 
we have assumed that the maturity of the PIK contract is T=2 years and α =0.5 
The total surplus is maximized when  PIK C  is set at the lowest possible level.  
This coincides with the maximum surplus to equity holders.  This is because the 
only source of market imperfection is related to bankruptcy  and missing the 
opportunity of a recovery, and a low PIK coupon level will minimize the 
probability of going bankrupt and the resulting deadweight costs of bankruptcy.   
Hence, the incentives of equity holders and PIK holders are aligned in the sense 
that each wants the minimum possible coupon in order to increase the total surplus 
and their own portion of the gains.   The fact that debt holders and PIK holders 
incentives are not aligned, because each wants to negotiate for a higher fraction of 
the payout in bankruptcy, means there are incentives for bargaining between PIK 
holders and debt holders.  This bargaining, in turn, makes equity holders and PIK 
holders bargain too.    
Note that PIK holder surplus is maximized when the coupon rate on PIKs is 
minimized  (because it increases the chance of survival) and is coupled with a 
minimum possible payout to debt holders (lowest possible p).  Indeed, it is possible 
to show that when PIK holders have all the bargaining power and are free to set 
the pair ( PIK C , p), the optimal parameter values correspond to the lowest possible 
coupon and the payout given by the solution to equation (26).  Debt holder surplus 
is maximized when the payout in bankruptcy to debt holders is maximized 
(maximum p), given  PIK C .  Also, given the parameter p, debt holders benefit with a 
lower  PIK C , because there is a larger probability that the debt holders will be able to 
enjoy continued coupon payments if the firm is healthy at the maturity of the PIK 
contract.     32 
Note that in many cases,  
max min
debt debt p p p ≤ ≤ , leads to PIK holders taking control 
of the firm in bankruptcy.  When PIK holders have much of the bargaining power, 
and they want to get control, they cannot just constrain their offer to p<0.5 in the 
event of bankruptcy, but also must choose the payoffs that maximize their chance 
of being in control on the upside.  On the upside, gains can be transferred via 
cashless warrants.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
We examine why financially constrained firms issue payment-in-kind bonds 
(PIKs) for restructuring their operations.  The introduction of PIK debt increases 
the value of a financially constrained firm in need of cash for restructuring over 
and above other forms of financing, such as regular debt, convertibles and equity.   
The fact that the introduction of a PIK contract increases firm value opens up 
the possibility of bargaining among claimants.  In the bargaining game, the terms 
of a PIK contract involve negotiations between PIK holders and equity holders, and 
between PIK investors and original bond holders.  In this sense, PIKs contracts 
simultaneously provides  an immediate automatic stay and a prepackaged 
bankruptcy procedure, features that reduce the deadweight costs of bankruptcy 
that is of significant importance for the types of firms involved in this form of 
financing.    
PIKs, held mostly by activist investors, are a more effective mechanism to 
take control of a firm than the alternatives of an outright acquisition of its equity, 
or letting the firm go bankrupt  and then buying its assets.  What makes PIKs 
effective for control purposes is that they provide investors with a barbell strategy 
that obtains equity at extremes of the distribution of firm values- at both high and   33 
low firm values.  PIKs can thus be seen as bets by creditors on the volatility of a 
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 Appendix A 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The surplus is equal to the value of the firm with PIK financing less the value of the 
outside options of the claim holders:  L V Z F α − − = Π ) 0 ( .  Substituting the value of 
the firm using equation (5) gives the desired result.  The surplus to debt, equity 
and PIK holders follows directly from the fact that the surplus to each claimant is 
equal to the market value after PIK financing minus their outside options, using 
equations (3), (4) and (6).  The surplus division is efficient in the sense that the total 
surplus is equal to the sum of the three parts.   
 
 
Proof of Remark 4  
Equity holders are willing to retire and pay back PIK holders the 
amount ( ) 1 ) ( − + Ζ =
rT PIK PIK e
r
Z C
T PK  at the maturity of the PIK debt contract only if 
the residual value of the equity, after this payment, is higher than H T PK + ) ( .  
Hence, at time T , after the PIK principal and its accrued coupons are paid by equity 
holders, it must be that  ( ) ( ) H T PK T V S + ≥
+ ) ( .  Thus equity holders gain from the 
second chance provided by the PIK sale and the contingent financing does not 
result in an immediate loss to equity holders.  Regular bond holders approve the 
deal only if their payoff is more than their outside option. 
 
Proof or Proposition 2 
An outright purchase of the equity of the firm, costs  the investors the 
restructuring costs as well as interim coupon flows:  Z+ ( )
rT e
r
CH − − 1 .  Payoffs to 
equity holders are 0 if the firm goes bankrupt with no control and they get control 
if the firm is solvent.  PIK financing, on the other hand, offers control of the firm 
both on the upside (in case of a swap of the final payout on PIKs for equity and any 
warrants), as well as on the downside if the firm goes bankrupt (1-p>0.5).  Thus, for 
the same investment, there is a higher probability of gaining control of the firm 
through PIKs. 




CH − − 1 .   Because costs of restructuring Z are incurred in either case, purchase 
of the assets of the bankrupt firm relative to PIK financing changes a sure cost of 
L V α - ( )
rT e
r
CH − − 1  incurred now to an expected cost of  ( ) ) (d N e V p
T r
L
− µ α incurred if 
the firm is in bankruptcy at maturity.   
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Proof of Remark 5 
If the PIK covenant allows for a debt for equity swap, on the upside the PIK 
holders gain control if their equity stake is greater than 0.5.  On the downside, were 
the firm to go bankrupt, PIK holders gain control if 1-p>0.5.  Cost of control with an 
outright purchase of the firm ‘s equity costs Z (or more) because the firm will have 
to fund restructuring costs as well as fund interim coupon flows until the firm is 
solvent.  For the same time horizon (T), control costs the same but provides control 





To solve the bargaining game we use the Lagrange multiplier function: 
∑ − − Π − − − − =
i L i PIK E L D Z V a Z a a V a L ) ( ) ( ) ( α λ α , which depends on the vector of 
asks,  i a , as well λ, requiring that:  0 ) ( = + − =
∂
∂






0 ) )( ( = + − − =
∂
∂





,  0 ) ( = + − =
∂
∂





  and          
Z V a
i i + + Π = ∑ α .  Solving gives 
* * *
E PIK L D a Z a V a = − = −α .  This solution is 
efficient and invariant to the disagreement point.  It shows that the total surplus is 
split among the three claim holders, taking into account their different outside 
options, such that 
* * *
PIK E D Π = Π = Π .   
 
Appendix C  
Comparative static results for 
min
debt p  and for 
max
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Table 1 
Recent issues of Payment-In-Kind bonds 
This table provides a list of firms that have issued payment-in-kind bonds over the years 2006 
and 2007.  Data is obtained from Standard and Poors, Bloomberg Information Services and from 
reports on company web sites.  The table reports the approximate proceeds in millions of dollars 
as well as the long term credit rating assigned to the company by S&P at the time of the issue.   
Year  Issuer  Purpose  Industry  ($ mill)  S&P  Spread 
2007  BMS  Dividend   Info Tech  149   CCC+  700 
2007  TerreStar Networks Inc.  Restructuring  Telecom  500   NA  1027 
2007  Beverages & More  Expansion  Retail  29   NA  905 
2007  Marsico   Dividend   Investment  400   CCC+  800 
2007  Marsico  Dividend   Investment  275   NA  800 
2006  Hard Rock Park  Restructuring/Exp  Entertainment  50   NA  973 
2006  Tim Hellas  LBO  Telecom  610   NA  825 
2006  Houghton Mifflin   Restructuring  Publishing  297   CCC+  675 
2006  Pipe Holdings  Restructuring  Manufacturing  121   NA  825 
2006  UGS  Restructuring  Software  297   B-  500 
2006  American Achievement  Restructuring  Manufacturing  147   CCC+  863 
2006  Libbey Glass  Restructuring  Manufacturing  100   NA  1152 
2006  GNC  Restructuring  Lifestyle prod.  421   CCC+  675 
2006  Eircom  Restructuring  Telecom  545   B-  700 
2006  United Components   Restructuring  Manufacturing  227   CCC+  700 
2006  Hellas Finance  No Information  Investment  262   NA  800 
2006  Panrico  LBO  Food Products  290  NA  NA 
2005  Aero Invest   Dividend  Aircraft leasing  478  NA  850 
2005  Ardagh Glass   Inves/Restructuring  Manufacturing  535  CCC  800 
2005  Innophos   Restructuring  Chemicals  120  NA  975 
2005  K&F aircraft brakes   LBO  Manufacturing  55  NA  850 
2005  Malcolm Glazer   LBO  Sports  515  NA  1150 
2005  New Look  Restructuring  Apparel  645  NA  1050 
2005  Viasystems   Restructuring  Computer  100  NA  750 
2005  Warner Music Group   Restructuring  Entertainment  200  B+  700 
2005  Wornick   LBO  Food Products  26  B+  1050 
2004  Cognis Holding  Div/Bridge to IPO  Chemicals  675  B+  900 
2004  Eco-bat   Dividend  Recycling  318  NA  700 
2004  ISS A/S (PurusCo)  Investment  Investment  170  B+  800 
2004  Jefferson Smurffit   Dividend   Packaging  414  CCC  850 
2004  Kabel Deutschland   Div/Bridge to IPO  Telecom  510  BB+  850 
2004  Sealy Corporation  LBO  Manufacturing  75  NA  NA 
2004  VNU World   LBO  Investment  127  NA  NA 
2003  Norcross Safety Products   Acquisition/Exapnsion  Manufacturing  100  B-  900 
2003  Northrop Grumman  Restructuring  Aviation  600  BB+  900 
2003  TDC A/S   LBO  Telecom  382  NA  NA 
 
 Figure 1 
Probability of control in solvency 
This figure provides a graphical depiction of the probability that PIK holders will 
control the firm conditional on the firm being solvent.  The Y-axis is the 
probability that PIK holders will gain control and the X-axis is the ratio of the firm 
value at which the firm faces restructuring costs (VL) to the bankruptcy barrier in 
the absence of such one-time costs (VB).  We assume that current  debt has a 
constant coupon flow  20 = CH , the risk free rate  05 . 0 = r , tax rate  35 . 0 = τ , 
recovery rate  5 . 0 = α  and asset volatility  45 . 0 = σ ,  5 . 1 = λ and 5 . 0 = p .   
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Figure 2 
Domain of Feasible Parameter Values and the Surplus 
This figure provides a graphical depiction of the domain of feasible values (Cpik, 
p) for the PIK contract.  We assume that current debt has a constant coupon flow 
20 = CH , the risk free rate  05 . 0 = r , tax rate  35 . 0 = τ ,  25 = Z ,  5 . 1 = λ  . 
 
 












debt p  